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Dynamic Consequences of the 1997 NFC Award: 





An adequate provision of social services is a concurrent function of federal 
and provincial governments. However, in Pakistan, the financing and delivery of 
social services largely prevails in the hands of provinces and major sources of 
revenues in the hand of federal government, which creates vertical imbalances. 
Federal transfers are the mechanism for their correction and these are constituted 
through the National Finance Commission (NFC) Awards.  The last NFC Award was 
constituted in 1997 and it changed both the size of divisible pool and the share of 
federal and provincial governments in the divisible pool. The changed provincial 
shares have based on higher tax revenue collection, which was not materialised 
during the following four-year period after the award. Therefore, provincial 
governments experienced the shortfall in the federal transfers during last four years 
after the award and have experienced a lower growth in transfers than projected in 
1997 NFC Award. This is in contrast with the provincial experience during 1991 
NFC Award, in which provinces had received higher revenue transfers from federal 
government than projected.  
The shortfall in federal transfers put uneasy pressure on provincial finances 
and left provincial governments with three options: increase efforts to mobilise 
higher revenues from own resources, curtailed expenditure and finally increase 
borrowing. On the one hand, in the presence of poor macroeconomic performance 
and persistence drought especially in the last year minimises the scope of increase in 
efforts to mobilise higher revenues from provincial own resources minimised the 
scope for first option. On the other hand, to protect some heads of public 
expenditures, 1997 NFC Award bifurcates public expenditure into priority and non-
priority expenditures. Current expenditure on social sector, debt servicing and 
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development expenditure were called priority expenditures while the remaining 
current expenditures included expenditures on law and order, community services, 
general administration were called non-priority expenditures. The idea of this 
bifurcation is to protect priority expenditures in case of any shortfall in revenues. 
Four-year experiences demonstrate that debt-servicing obligations were fulfilled by 
provinces and the shortfall in revenues generally translated on development 
expenditures. However, ambiguity occurs in case of social sector expenditure that 
leads to the following question. Have social sector expenditures been protected 
during the four period or not? Alternatively, what is the impact of 1997 NFC Award 
on social sector expenditures?   
The estimated expenditure response of provincial governments after the 1997 
NFC Award is the focus of this paper. Estimating responsiveness raises an 
interesting empirical question, which has been largely ignored in intergovernmental 
transfers literature. The question is whether the expenditure response to changes in 
the design of intergovernmental transfers is symmetrical. In other words, is its 
magnitude the same for both social services expenditures and other expenditures? 
Previous empirical studies have not distinguished whether the social services 
expenditures or other expenditures affected largely in case of any increase or 
decrease in the federal transfers to provinces.  This paper hypothesises that 
provincial responses in case of change in design of federal transfers are asymmetric. 
Asymmetric provincial expenditure response may occur for a number of reasons. 
Primarily, expenditure on social services is generally considered as a source of 
poverty reduction. Second, expenditure on social services especially at primary or 
basic level is considered to be subject to high external benefits. Third, social services 
expenditures are the focal point of Social Action Plan (SAP I&II). Finally, one of the 
main objectives of the 1997 NFC Award was to protect priority expenditures 
including social services expenditures. The 1997 NFC Award offers a good 
opportunity to test asymmetric response hypothesis for provincial government 
expenditures. 
The next section provides descriptive statistics on provincial expenditure 
trends, a comparative structure of provincial resources before and after 1997 NFC 
Award. Then a micro-theoretic model of provincial expenditures is developed and 
estimated.  Finally, some concluding comments are offered. 
 
COMPARATIVE GROWTH IN PROVINCIAL REVENUES 
AND EXPENDITURES 
This section offers summery statistics of comparative growth rates on 
provincial revenues and expenditures before and after 1997 NFC Award. It reports a 
set of combined aggregated descriptive statistics of four provinces.
1  
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Provincial revenues can be divided into two broad categories; own revenues 
receipts and federal transfers and grants. Table 1 shows that growth in provincial 
general revenues declined after the 1997 NFC Award. This is the outcome of both 
change in design of federal transfers to the provinces and low tax collection. The 
overall decline in the growth of provincial general revenue receipts is more than 9 
percent, which is largely the outcome of sizeable decline (over 10 percent) in federal 
transfers. Federal tax assignment experienced the largest decline in growth of over 
19 percent. After 1997 NFC Award growth in provincial tax receipts declined by 4 
percent due to poor performance in agriculture sector mainly because of drought.  
However, increase in growth rate of federal development and non-development 
grants diluted the impact of lower growth in other sources of revenues. 
 
Table 1 
Pre- and Post-1997 NFC Award Growth Rate of Revenues and Expenditures 
(Aggregate of Four Provinces Combined) 
Pre 1997 NFC 
Award 




FY 1992 to    
FY 1997 
FY 1998 to  
FY 2001 




General Revenue Receipts  17.8  8.7  –9.1 
Total Provincial Own Receipts 11.7  9.4  –2.3 
Provincial Tax Receipts 13.3 9.3  –4.0 
Provincial Non-tax Receipts 9.9  9.4  –0.5 
Federal Transfers and Grants*  19.1  8.5  –10.6 
Federal Tax Assignment  26.5  7.0  –19.5 
Federal Non Development 
Grants 57.4  62.0  4.6 
Federal Development Grants  –9.7  5.5  15.2 
Current Expenditure  15.6 9.7  –5.9 
Debt Servicing  11.1  5.8  –5.2 
Service-related Expenditure  16.9  10.5  –6.4 
  Social Sectors   18.0  5.7  –12.3 
  Other Sectors  16.0  14.3  –1.8 
Development Expenditure  2.0  8.7  6.7 
Social Sectors   7.3  –2.9  –10.2 
Other Sectors  –2.9  20.0  22.9 
Source: Various Provincial Annual Budget Statements.   
* Included devisable pool transfers, straight transfers and Profit from Hydroelectricity. 
   ACGR= Annual Compound Growth Rate. Muhammad Sabir  970
The provincial expenditures growth rates portray an interesting picture. 
According to which without exception each and every component of provincial 
current expenditures experienced slow growth after 1997 NFC Award. This is the 
outcome of the government policy to reduce public expenditure at all levels, coupled 
with low growth in general revenue receipts. Another interesting aspect is the higher 
growth in other services related expenditures component of development 
expenditures.  
 
The Key Elements of the 1997 NFC Award 
1997 NFC Award was innovative in nature and changed intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers mechanism at large scale. This award differed with the previous 
awards in many ways and introduced some new ideas in the design of federal 
transfers. First and the foremost, this award recognised the common resource pool 
problem faced by Pakistan. The recognition of common pool problem is new in the 
literature of fiscal federalism and also highlighted by De Mello and Luiz (2000) in 
the context of other developing countries. This recognition in Pakistan led toward the 
formation of the National Resource Picture, which was based on the projected values 
of all sources of revenues included tax, non-tax revenues and borrowing of both tiers 
of governments.  
The other major step, which we already highlighted, is bifurcation of 
expenditures into priority and non-priority expenditures. Priority expenditures 
contained expenditures on defence, debt servicing, social services and development. 
The reaming head of expenditures including economic services, community services, 
general administration etc. were categorised as non-priority expenditures. The basic 
idea behind this bifurcation was to protect priority expenditures in case of any 
decline in resources, without damaging the national interest of the country.  
The estimation of provincial shares was based on a four step methodology. 
As the first step, provincial expenditures were projected till 2001-02, based on the 
benchmarks chosen by provincial representatives.  Secondly, national resources 
were projected for the same period. Based on these projections, provincial share 
was then estimated, which is equivalent to all provincial current expenditures and 
fifty percent of development expenditures. Finally, to address horizontal 
imbalances constitutional subventions were allocated to relatively backward 
provinces NWFP and Balochistan.   
Table 2 highlights the change in provincial share in divisible pool since the 
separation of East Pakistan. Table 2 conveyed that 1991, NFC Award increased the 
share of provinces by including federal excise duty on tobacco and sugar.  Another, 
important point which emerges from Table 2 is that provinces had gotten 80 percent 
of two major federal taxes “Sales Tax” and “Income and Corporation Tax”, which 
were the focus of tax and tariff reforms initiated in early 90s.  1997 NFC Award and Social Sector Expenditures  971
Table 2 
Provincial Share in Federal Taxes 
  Divisible Pool  NFC 1974  NFC 1991  NFC 1997 
A. 
 
Income Tax and  
Corporation Tax  80% 80%  37.5% 
B. Other  Direct  Taxes  –  –  37.5% 




Central Excise Duty 
–  Tobacco 












 –  Cotton  80%  80% 
– 
Source:  Pakistan (1997). 
 
In contrast, 1997 NFC Award included all federal taxes in divisible pool and 
decreased the provincial share from 80 percent to 37.5 percent, which is less than 
half of previous share. This change was based on optimistic targets based on certain 
macroeconomic projections like GDP growth, inflation etc. and higher expectations 
from tax and tariff reforms. However, during the four-year period these expectations 
did not materialise due to many external and internal shocks, which largely affected 
federal tax collection.  
Table 3 highlights both the effect of these external and internal shocks, and 
the impact of change in design on real federal transfers to the provinces. The 
projected amount of federal transfers and constitutional subventions at constant 
rupees of 1980-81 were Rs 40.9 billion but in reality, it turned out only Rs 32.3 
billion. The shortfall increased with passage of time and reached its peek during 
2000-01, in which projected, real transfers were Rs 55.6 billion but provinces 
received only Rs 38.3 billion.  
To quantify the impact of change in design of federal transfers we projected 
federal transfers by using the formula of 1991 NFC Award based on projected 
revenues of 1997 NFC Award.  Table 3 also reveals that if the pervious formula of 
1991 NFC Award were to continue then provinces would get higher revenues as a 
result of higher share of buyont taxes. Similarly, the impact of change in design also 
increased in the later years.  Muhammad Sabir  972
Table 3 
Real Federal Transfers to Provinces 
(Rs  Million) 
1997-98 1998-99  1999-2000 2000-01 
Divisible Pool Transfers      
Actuals    25,532 24,992 27,494 30,111 
1997 NFC Award Projections  33,280  36,481  40,822  46,691 
Projections As Per 1991 NFC  Award*  38,941  43,304  49,498  58,920 
Straight Transfers**      
Actuals    4,986 4,602 5,733 6,369 
1997 NFC Award Projections  5,816  5,992  6,294  6,742 
As Per 1991 NFC Projections  5,816  5,992  6,294  6,742 
Constitutional Subvention      
Actuals    1,812 1,904 1,943 1,836 
1997 NFC Award Projections  1,814  1,904  2,040  2,171 
As Per 1991 NFC Projections  –  –  –  – 
Total Transfers      
 Actuals   32,329  31,498  35,169  38,315 
1997 NFC Award Projections  40,910  44,376  49,156  55,605 
As Per 1991 NFC Projections  44,757  49,296  55,792  65,662 
Source: Estimates based on Report of 1997 NFC Award and Federal Explanatory Memorandums. 
* Projected on the basis of Projected Revenues of 1997 NFC Award. 
** Included Profit from Hydroelectricity. 
 
Table 4 presents the two types of descriptive statistics. First, it highlights the 
shortfall, which occurred in federal transfers due to low tax collection. This is the 
difference between actual federal transfers. The shortfall increased after the nuclear 
blast and reached its peak during 2000-01.  In real terms the impact of low tax 
collection increased from Rs 8.6 billion to Rs 17.3 billion more than double just in a 
four-year period. The impact of low tax collection was dominated on divisible pool 
transfers. 
Second, Table 4 highlights the impact of 1997, NFC Award on federal 
transfers. This is the difference between 1997 NFC Award projected federal transfers 
to the provinces and estimated transfers based on projected revenues of 1997 NFC 
Award by using the formula of the 1991 NFC Award. According to this, provinces 
can get Rs 3.8 billion more than actual transfers in real terms during 1997-98 which 
further increased to over Rs 10 billion during the year 2000-01. This large difference 
occurred due to higher growth in sales tax and, income and corporate tax. 
Consequently, the provinces were largely affected by the low tax collection as 
compared to change in design. 1997 NFC Award and Social Sector Expenditures  973
Table 4 
Change in Real Federal Transfers to Provinces 
(Rs  Million) 
1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 
Divisible Pool Transfers        
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –7,748  –11,489 –13,328  –16,581 
Imapct of Change in Transfer’s Design –5,661  –6,823  –8,676  –12,228 
Total –13,409 –18,312 –22,004  –28,809 
Straight Transfers        
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –831  –1,390  –561  –373 
Imapct of Change in Transfer’s Design 0  0  0  0 
Total –831  –1,390  –561  –373 
Constitutional Subvention        
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –2  0  –97  –335 
Imapct of Change in Transfer’s Design 1,814  1,904  2,040  2,171 
Total 1,812  1,904  1,943  1,836 
Overall Impact        
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –8,580  –12,879 –13,987  –17,289 
Imapct of Change in Transfer’s Design –3,848  –4,919  –6,636  –10,057 
Total –12,428 –17,798 –20,623  –27,347 
Source: Estimates based on Table 3. 
 
DYNAMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1997 NFC AWARD  
The treatment of the 1997, NFC Award to this point has been explicitly based 
on descriptive statistics. Although these statistics provided a broad picture of the 
implications of 1997 NFC Award but this broad picture is incomplete without any 
empirical findings.  Unfortunately, we do not have many empirical studies that bring 
to bear on the matter of intergovernmental transfers. There is a substantial 
descriptive literature addressing the many aspects of the intergovernmental transfers 
with respect to fiscal competition among the sub-national governments [Musgrave 
(1997)], market incentive of federalism [Qian and Weingast (1997)], inter-
governmental transfers and deadweight losses in tax system [Smart (1996)], and 
finally coordination failure [De Mello and Luiz (2000)]. However, this body of work 
really does not shed much light on the normative question of dynamic consequences 
of any change in designed mechanism of intergovernmental transfers on provincial 
finances. 
In an interesting study that is of relevance here, Ghaus and Pasha (1996) find 
evidences of strategic interaction in intergovernmental transfers and provincial 
expenditures. They developed an econometric model for Pakistan to evaluate the 
consequence of the NFC Award 1991. The model thoroughly studied the fiscal Muhammad Sabir  974
relationship between the provinces and federal government and, highlighted the key 
features of provincial finances. However, their study did not bifurcate expenditure 
and just estimated the overall impact of transfers on total expenditure. In contrast, 
this paper has developed a model to analyse the impact of intergovernmental 
transfers and other federal grants on social sector expenditures. 
 
Methodological Framework   
The methodological framework based on the assumption that 
politicians/officials want to maximise the utility of the typical consumer (median 
consumer) in their jurisdiction subject to budget constraint. For the sake of 
simplicity, consumption basket of typical citizen (median consumer) can be divided 
into two broad groups; publicly provided goods and services (A), and privately 
provided goods and services (B). Utility was assumed to depend positively on the 
quantity of goods and services provided by the provincial government (A) and on the 
level of consumption of private goods (B).  
   U = U (QA, QB) 
The goods and services provided by provincial government can be split into 
social services and, other goods and services 
U = U (QS, QO, QB) 
  The quantity of demand of each good and services depends upon the 
expenditure on it. In the case of private goods and services, expenditure would be 
equal to real per capita disposable income of the consumer or ( y – R ), where y is the 
real per capita income and R is the real per capita revenue received by the 
government. Similarly, in the case of publicly provided goods and services, 
expenditure would be equal to provincial expenditure on social services (SE) and 
other services (OE). Therefore, the utility function can be rewritten as  
  U = U (SE, OE, Y – R)    … … … … …    (1) 
 R includes both tax and non-tax revenues, while SE and OE consist of both 
recurring, and development expenditures on publicalIy provided social services and 
other services.  We exclude the payments for servicing of debt, as these do not 
benefited citizens directly through provision of services. 
The sources of revenues for provincial governments except its own revenues 
are federal transfers from divisible pool, development and non-development grants 
and borrowings. Therefore, the budget constraint of the provincial government (at 
current prices) can be expressed as: 1997 NFC Award and Social Sector Expenditures  975
  G B T R p OE SE p + + + = + 1 2 ) (   … … … …  (2) 
Where Y = real per capita income. 
  R =  real per capita provincial revenue (include both tax and non-tax 
revenues). 
  SE  =  real per capita social sector expenditures (both recurring and 
development). 
  OE = real per capita other expenditures (both recurring and development). 
  P1 = General Price Level (CPI). 
  P2 = price index of public expenditure. 
  T  = per capita total intergovernmental transfers. 
  B = per capita borrowing by the provincial government. 
G consisted of two types of grants from federal government to provincial 
governments. These are lump sum grants (heavily consists of development grants) 
and deficit grant (heavily consists of non-development and non-obligatory grants). 
Therefore, by definition, total flow of grants was given as:  
1 0 ], ) ( [   0 1 2 0 p p m G T R p OE SE p m G G − − − + + =  …  …  (3) 
Where m = proportion of the revenue deficit financed by deficit grants. 
Deficit grant was played a very significant role in the provincial finances 
before 1991 but after that, this option was curtailed in the 1991 NFC Award. 
However, lump sum grants are still provided to the provinces for their development 
projects.  
Substituting (3) into (2) we obtain, 
B G G T R p OE SE p D + + + + = + 0 1 2 ) (   … … …  (4) 
After addition of p1y on both sides of the equation (4) budget constraint can 
be written as:  
B G G T Y p OSE p SSE p R Y P D + + + + = + + − 0 1 2 2 1 ) (  …  …  (5) 
 Based on the above set of equations, a utility maximisation problem can be 
set up as follows: 
)] ( ) ( [ ) , , ( ) , , , ( 2 1 OE SE p R Y p I OE SE R Y U OE SE R + − − − λ + − = λ l  …  (6) 
Where I = P1Y + T + G0 + GD + B 
The first order conditions are as follows: Muhammad Sabir  976
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The above derivation based on micro-theoretic approach provides the 
information on the signs of partial derivatives of the function, but it needs an explicit 
utility function for estimation purposes. In the analysis of consumer behaviour, many 
utility functions were used and among them, we chose the analogous Stone-Geary 
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The Stone-Geary utility function has particular advantages over other 
functions. The most important advantage of the Stone-Geary utility function is the 
inclusion of y0, SE0, and OE0, which are “minimum survival bundles” and ensure the 
subsistence level of consumer demand for public and private goods and services. 
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Substituting the value of p2SE, p2E and p1(Y–R) from (12), (13) and (14) into 
(5) we obtained 
… …  (11)1997 NFC Award and Social Sector Expenditures  977
) (
1
) ( 0 0 2 0 0 1 OE SE p
m
B




+ + + − =
λ
 …  …  (15) 
Minimum bundle of income y0  was assumed to be partly constant and partly 
rises with income y. 
y0 = a0 + a1 y 
Therefore, Equation 19 can be written as:  
) (
1
) 1 ( 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 1 OE SE P
m
B




+ + + − − =
λ
… …  (16) 
After substituting the value from equation 16 into 12, 13 and 14, we finally 
have the following system of equation for estimation: 
2 0 1 0 1
1
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Equations (17) and (18) are the desired expenditure equations. Divided both 
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After 1991 NFC Award value of m became zero 
… … … …  (17)
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The value of D91 is 1 prior to 1991 NFC Award otherwise zero and, value of 
D92 is 1 after the 1991 NFC Award, other wise zero 
Due to the limitation on availability of the basic data (for example, the data of 
provincial gross domestic products are not available), we are unable to conduct a 
province wise analysis. Therefore, the above model has been estimated for the four 
provincial governments combined. Annual budget statements of the individual 
provinces have been used to generate the aggregate database for key provincial 
budgetary magnitudes. 
Equations (22) and (23) were estimated for the period, 1972-73 to 2000-01. 
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= = R  
t-statistic in parenthesis    *Significant at 5 percent level 1997 NFC Award and Social Sector Expenditures  979
All estimated signs are consistent with the developed model. Each coefficient, 
except the income (y) in other expenditure (OE) equation is significantly different 
from zero at a five-percent significance level with a t-test. The value of adjusted R
2 
indicates that the first model explain almost 98 percent variation and second model 
explain almost 84 percent variation in provincial social and other expenditures. The 
estimated coefficients of Equations 22 and 23 can be used to draw the inferences 
about the behaviour of provincial governments.  
According to the estimates of Equations 22 and 23, impact of any increase or 
decrease in federal transfers is relatively higher on social sector expenditures. One rupee 
increase or decrease in either real federal transfers or lump sum grants or borrowing can 
affect 18.51 paisas to social sector expenditures and 16.35 paisas to other provincial 
expenditures in real terms. In general, these estimated coefficients of federal transfers 
reflect that almost 35 percent real provincial service related expenditures depends on 
federal transfers. The remaining 65 percent of federal transfers are translated on either 
debt servicing or reduction in efforts of resource mobilisation. The fact of low resource 
mobilisation efforts at provincial level is also reflected from the coefficient of income, 
which has the meager values of 0.026 and 0.015.  In other words, one rupee increase in 
income translated to less than three paisas in real social sector expenditures and less than 
two paisas in other services related expenditures.   
The NFC Award 1991 truncated the option of deficit grants for the provincial 
budget deficits, which was previously available and fully utilised by the provinces. 
This truncation of deficit grants reflected through the behaviour of the provinces in the 
utilisation of the debt. To capture the effect of truncation of deficit grants on utilisation 
of debt, we used two interactive dummies D91 (one for 1972-73 to 1990-91 otherwise 
zero) and D92 (zero for 1972-73 to 1990-91 otherwise one). The coefficient of debt 
interacted with D91 reveals that until 1991 a large component of debt translated into 
provincial expenditures, in the areas of either expenditure on social services or other 
services. However, elimination of deficit grants changed the provincial behaviour after 
1991. Provinces used borrowings in a way similar to federal transfers and grants. This 
change is largely affected other services related expenditures. The coefficient of debt 
reduced after 1991 from 0.3266 to 0.1851 in social services and from 0.4215 to 0.1635 
in other services related expenditures. This change clearly demonstrates that the 
provincial government started utilisation of debt to finance debt servicing.  
Finally, inflation negatively affects real social and other expenditures largely. 
The impact of inflation is higher on other expenditures as compared to social 
services. The other contributors in growth of provincial expenditures are captured 
through DUM1
2 and DUM2
3 both are positive and significant.  In the growth of 
 
2DUM1 has values 1 for 1985-86, 1.25 for 86-87, 1.5 for 87-88 and 0.75 for 88-89 for five point 
programme, 0.25 for 1993-94, .40 for 94-95, 0.5 for 95-96 and 0.25 for 96-97 for SAP-I and –0.75 in 
2000-01 for   drought. 
3DUM2 has 1 in 1992-93 base year of SAP-1 and 1 in 2000-01 for drought. Muhammad Sabir  980
social sector expenditures, major contributors were the five-point programme, Social 
Action Programme–I, while drought affected social sector expenditure negatively. In 
contrast, other expenditures were higher during 1992-93 and 2000-01. 1992-93 was 
the base year for SAP-I and 2000-01 is the drought year. During drought year 
provinces, spend more on social safety nets and other schemes of water 
managements.    
Given the above result, we are now in the position to conduct comparative 
analysis on the dynamic consequences of 1997 NFC Award on provincial real social 
sector and other services related expenditures. Table 5 provides the estimated 
shortfall in provincial real social and other services related expenditures due to 
shortfall in federal transfers. The estimates shows that the impact of low tax 
collection is greater on real social sector expenditures as compared to other services 
related expenditures. In 1997-98, low tax collections dented social services 
expenditures by more than Rs 1.5 billion and its impact further increased to over Rs 
3.2 billion in 2000-01. In contrast, the impact of change in design was not significant 
in 1997-98. However, in 2000-01 impact of change in design also increased to Rs. 
1.8 billion.  
Other services related expenditures also experienced a greater decline in later 
years. Decline in other real provincial services related expenditures is lower than real 
social sector expenditures. In 1997-98 the combined impact of low tax collection and 
change in design on other expenditures was around Rs 2 billion, which rose to 
approximately Rs 4.5 billion in 2000-01. 
 
Table 5 
Dynamic Consequences of the 1997 NFC Award for the Provincial 
Real Social Sector and Other Services-related Expenditures 
(Rs  Million) 
   1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 
Social Sector Expenditures      
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –1,588  –2,384  –2,589  –3,201 
Impact of Change in Transfer’s Design  –712  –911  –1,229  –1,862 
Total –2,301  –3,295  –3,818  –5,063 
Other Expenditures      
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –1,403  –2,106  –2,287  –2,827 
Impact of Change in Transfer’s Design  –629  –804  –1,085  –1,645 
Total –2,032  –2,910  –3,372  –4,472 
Source: Author’s Estimates. 1997 NFC Award and Social Sector Expenditures  981
However, a comparison of social services and other expenditures in absolute 
terms did not portray the true picture. Therefore, we estimated relative impact of 
these changes on social and other services related expenditures. Table 6 highlights 
the relative comparative statistics, which clearly shows the impact of low tax 
collection and change in design is much greater on social services expenditures.  
 
Table 6  
Dynamic Consequences of the 1997 NFC Award for Provincial  
Real Social Sector and Other Services-related Expenditures 
  1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 
Social Sector Expenditures        
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –10.2%  –15.9% –17.7%  –23.7% 
Impact of Change in Transfer’s Design  –4.6%  –6.1%  –8.4%  –13.8% 
Total –14.8%  –22.0% –26.1%  –37.5% 
Other Expenditures        
Impact of Low Tax Collection  –8.1%  –12.5% –11.7%  –13.2% 
Impact of Change in Transfer’s Design  –3.6%  –4.8%  –5.5%  –7.7% 
Total –11.7%  –17.2% –17.2%  –20.9% 
Source: Author’s Estimates. 
 
According to the estimates of Table 6 combined impact of low tax collection 
and change in design was around 15 percent in 1997-98 that further increased to 37.5 
percent in 2000-01.  However, the combined impact of low tax collection and change 
in design on other services related expenditures was roughly 12 percent in 1997-98 
that increased to roughly 21 percent in 2000-01. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the objective of the 1997 NFC Award, bulk of the shortfall in 
federal transfers to provinces translated into real social sector expenditures, which 
experienced slow growth and a large deviation from the trend. According to the 
estimates based on micro-theoretic model, any decline in real transfers largely 
affected real social sector expenditures. In a nut shell, bifurcation of public 
expenditure into priority and non-priority expenditures in the 1997 NFC Award 
failed to protect social sector expenditures.      
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The current division of fiscal powers in the Federation of Pakistan is one of 
the major causes of weakness in domestic resource mobilisation efforts. The 
revenue-sharing arrangements derived from the Government of India Act 1935 laid 
down the formula for distribution of revenue from divisible sources. After 
independence in 1947 these provisions were incorporated into successive 
constitutions, delineating the respective revenue-raising powers of the federal and 
provincial governments. 
An analysis of revenue sharing arrangements in Pakistan indicates that the 
constitutional division of legislative, administrative and financial powers between 
the constituent units of the Federation like many other countries opted in favour of 
Federal form of Government have not produced a congenial environment for policy-
making on improvement in relations between the federal and provincial 
governments. At both levels of government, groups wielding substantial political and 
bureaucratic power have influenced policy-making and policy implementation. 
The fundamental weakness of 1991 National Finance Commission (NFC) 
Award was that it assigned generous revenues to the provincial governments without 
properly assessing its implication on domestic resource mobilisation efforts and 
financial requirements of the federal government to meet its constitutional 
obligations. Thus, implementation of 1991 Award has created a situation similar to 
that faced by Government of India after the promulgation of Government of India 
Act 1919. Under the 1919 revenue sharing arrangements States share in divisible 
pool has created financial imbalance between the Centre and the State Governments. 
The increased flow of shared resources to State Government weakened the Central 
Government financial position to the extent that the Central Government had to 
borrow from the State Governments, which undermined the Central Government 
Authority. The Government of India Act 1921 and subsequently Government of 
India Act 1935 were to correct the imbalance. The 1991 NFC has created a similar 
situation. 
Soon after the implementation of 1991 NFC award the situation of public 
finance necessitated a fundamental re-examination of the issues relating to revenue 
sharing arrangements in manner that the distribution of revenues between the two 
levels of government should be to adequately protect priority expenditures on social 
services, debt servicing and defence. It was also necessary to build an incentive 
environment for higher resource mobilisation by all levels of government. Muhammad Aslam Khan  984
The 1997 NFC Award may be seen as an effort to correct the situation. The 
Award approach of using the National Resource Picture for making governments 
revenue and expenditure projections and deriving thereby the fiscal transfers to the 
provinces based on their expenditure needs which cannot be financed from their own 
resources was an improvement over the traditional methodology, which involved 
projecting benchmark established both provincial current expenditure and own 
receipts. 
The 1997 NFC Award ensured that the development expenditure needs of the 
provincial governments should be financed partially by divisible pool transfers. The 
Award assured provinces source of revenue for planning their budgets. Thus, the 
Award enhanced the fiscal autonomy of the provincial governments. 
Comparison of 1997 NFC Award with any award should be made carefully. 
There are so many caveats. During the 1997 NFC period Pakistan economy 
experienced periods of slow growth and many internal and external shocks. The 
analysis of consolidated budget (federal and provincial) of the period indicates that 
increase in government revenues was substantially below the award projections. The 
shortfall in government revenues has contributed in sizeable reduction in the 
divisible resources to the provinces. As a result, growth in government expenditure, 
particularly development expenditure was well below the NFC projection. 
Expenditure on social sectors was also influenced because of the shortfall in 
resources. 
The paper has not concentrated to a single issue. It focuses on many topics 
without much clarity. Nevertheless, it provides enough thinking for discussion and 
future research on the subject. 
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